INTRODUCTION
Federal negotiation of prescription drug prices on behalf of Medicare beneficiaries is a contentious, but timely, issue. In authorizing Medicare Part D in 2003, Congress explicitly forbade the federal government from directly negotiating prices with pharmaceutical companies. 1 The rationale was that the market would lower prices and that each of the private prescription drug plans, in competition to attract more Medicare beneficiaries, would negotiate with prescription manufacturers to reduce costs.
Whether the market has truly been successful in lowering prescription drug prices to the extent that the writers of the legislation had hoped is a subject of current debate. A survey of almost 2,000 seniors in late 2006 found that 52% were saving money with Part D. 2 Early nationally representative data recently released suggest a small, but appreciable, decrease in out-of-pocket spending and cost-related medication nonadherence with Part D. 3, 4 There is some evidence of price increases under Part D, however, 5 and many critics of the non-negotiation clause point to Veterans Administration prices to show that direct negotiation by the federal government and price control statutes could result in greater savings. A report by Families USA, which looked at the top 20 drugs prescribed to seniors, found that VA prices were substantially lower than the cheapest Part D plans, with a median price difference of 58%. 6 With Medicare and Medicaid spending projected to account for over 30% of the federal budget in 10 years, every possible avenue for cost savings in prescription drugs must be entertained. 7 The Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) is a federal contract and list of prices for prescription drugs available for purchase by certain federal agencies, which include the VA, Department of Defense (DOD), Public Health Service (PHS), Bureau of Prisons, the District of Columbia, U.S. territorial governments, and some Indian Tribal governments. 8 Drug manufacturers are effectively required to limit their FSS price to the lowest price that is charged to any private purchaser in the US, net of all rebates or other price concessions. Under the Veterans Health Care Act of 1992, drug manufacturers are required to list their brand-name drugs on the FSS for them to be covered by Medicaid. In 2003, sales under FSS contracts totaled around $4.5 billion for brand-name drugs, and costs were approximately 53% of the average wholesale price (AWP). 8 Drug manufacturers are also required to sell certain drugs -about 1/3 of the drugs on the schedule -to the VA, DOD, PHS, and Coast Guard (the "Big Four") at a price that is often even lower, the Federal Ceiling Price (FCP), which is statutorily defined rather than negotiated (approximately 50% of the AWP). 8 Finally, statute determines that FSS prices are not allowed to rise faster than general inflation over the course of multiyear contracts By contrast, drug prices in the private market have grown considerably faster than the CPI. 9 The FSS is publicly available and represents prices that are set through government statute and negotiation without formularies. To inform the debate about the potential savings associated with government negotiation of drug prices, we used actual prescription utilization and cost data from the nationally representative Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) to estimate the potential savings prior to Part D if FSS prices were available to seniors. Any two drug formulations that represented one unique drug were combined (e.g., diltiazem and diltiazem hcl). Drugs that were subsequently withdrawn from the market (i.e., rofecoxib) were excluded. In addition, aspirin was excluded because it is available over-the-counter, and insulin preparations were excluded as well because of difficulty calculating dose in MEPS. After accounting for similar formulations and exclusions, 161 unique drugs were included in this analysis, which accounted for 71% of total prescription spending among this age group.
METHODS

Data
Calculation of Prices and Potential Savings
We obtained information about the total expenditure for each drug from MEPS, including the amount spent by the individual and the amount paid by any insurance coverage. We calculated the expenditure per unit (i.e., tablet, vial, tube) for each drug in MEPS and in the FSS, in 2006 dollars. The availability of the actual drug expenditures for each product is an improvement over previous estimates of drug costs, which use a standard discount off the average wholesale price because actual expenditures are not typically available. 10 Prices from the FSS were current for 2006.
To inflate MEPS expenditures to 2006 dollars, we increased the 2003 expenditures by 8.4% and the 2004 expenditures by 6.1%, representing the increase in the consumer price index over those years. 12 We then subtracted the FSS cost from the MEPS expenditure to get a savings per unit and multiplied this by the observed number of units purchased in MEPS to get a savings for each prescription. Savings for all prescriptions were totaled for each subject to calculate the annual per capita savings (both out-of-pocket savings plus savings to any insurance plan). We then calculated overall savings from a population perspective. The calculation using the top 200 drug formulations was the primary analysis. We also calculated the potential savings for the subgroup of the top 10 most commonly used drugs, as it may be more feasible initially to negotiate a more limited sample of drugs. Finally, as an additional sensitivity analysis, we calculated savings for the entire sample assuming varying abilities to negotiate prices down to the FSS level (i.e., prices of FSS 5%, FSS 10%). This sensitivity analysis was also done to address the concern that MEPS data may not reflect the rebates that health plans receive for drug costs.
Data Analysis
Median annual savings per person were compared across demographic groups using Wilcoxon rank sum or KruskalWallis tests when appropriate. The MEPS data include sampling weights that reflect the survey design, sampling frame, and adjustments for household non-response and planned over-sampling. The weighted results therefore represent estimates for the non-institutionalized US population. All analyses were performed using SAS (version 9, SAS Institute, Inc., Cary, NC) and SUDAAN (version 9.0) and employed the appropriate weighting and survey design variables to obtain these population estimates.
RESULTS
Characteristics of the Sample
There were 150,687 prescriptions for eligible drugs. A total of 4,412 prescriptions (2.9%) could not be matched to a FSS price, and an additional 836 (0.5%) were missing a prescription quantity in MEPS. Thus, the final sample was 145,439 prescriptions and 6,135 individuals, weighted to represent 1,354,700,000 prescriptions and 60,071,166 individuals over these 2 years. In 2004, the total expenditures for these drugs were $48 billion. More than half of the sample were 65-74 years of age, and they were predominantly white, with a high school degree or less (Table 1 ). In addition to Medicare, 54% of the sample had supplemental insurance.
Potential Annual Savings
The potential annual savings in drug expenditures if FSS prices were substituted for current prices is $21. (Table 2 ; p<.001, p<.001, p<.001, and p=.004, respectively). For the subset of seniors who currently have supplemental coverage in addition to Medicare, using FSS prices rather than the prices they currently pay would save $11.3 billion (95% CI, $10.6 billion, $11.9 billion). The top ten drugs used by seniors are listed in Table 3 , with the associated annual savings if FSS prices were substituted for the entire sample. Atorvastatin (Lipitor) was the most commonly prescribed medication among the sample, with a national estimated savings of $1.3 billion, which represents a savings of 29% off current expenditures for Lipitor. Overall, savings from the top ten drugs using FSS prices would be approximately $5.9 billion (95% CI, $5.7 billion, $6.1 billion). 13 Whether these savings would be passed on to patients or retained by their health plans, they would potentially leave more resources in the health-care system to treat more patients and more conditions. Even if the prices were set at 50% higher than the 2006 FSS, the savings would still be over 20% for these drugs. The magnitude of these numbers has significant implications in the debate on whether or not the government should be directly involved in setting drug prices on behalf of Medicare Part D. To our knowledge, there have been no prior national estimates of the potential savings to Medicare if FSS prices were used for drug purchases. A report by Families USA comparing prices found in the VA with prices under various Part D plans found a 58% median difference in prices, which is consistent with the substantial savings demonstrated in this analysis. 6 In addition, there is evidence that FSS prices are fairly similar to prices paid by the Canadian government, 14 and prior work has compared Canadian prices to the higher current commercial US prices. 15, 16 There is considerable debate about whether negotiation by the federal government would actually lead to lower prices without the imposition of nationwide formulary restrictions that the public might not accept. [17] [18] [19] The nonpartisan Con- 21 Some data suggest that prices for certain drugs have actually increased with Part D, and data from the National Health Expenditure Accounts show that overall drug prices increased in both 2005 and 2006 at 3.6 percent.
5,22
The CBO did say that some savings were possible if the government could negotiate prices with manufacturers of drugs with no competition from therapeutic alternatives -drugs such as clopidogrel (Plavix). 20 Our analysis quantifies some of these potential savings. Included in the list of top ten drugs used by seniors is one that has no real therapeutically equivalent competitor on the market [clopidogrel (Plavix)]. Combined savings from using FSS prices for just this one drug would total almost 400 million dollars annually. Clopidogrel is one of the medications whose price has reportedly increased in Part D. 5 The ability of the government to extend prices from the federal supply schedule to the much larger population of Medicare beneficiaries is uncertain. However, the FSS is a clear example of a set of drugs available to federal purchasers that is negotiated by the government without a formulary. We believe this makes the FSS, and our analysis, very relevant to the discussion on federal negotiation of drug prices and important for moving the Medicare debate forward. While these exact FSS prices may not be negotiated for Part D, our sensitivity analysis suggests that almost $10 billion could still be saved annually if these drugs were subjected to FSS prices plus 50%. In addition, for seniors who already have private supplemental insurance in addition to Medicare, price differences with the FSS amount to billions of dollars. The magnitude of these price differences between commercial and FSS prices is striking, regardless of the economic feasibility for Medicare of this kind of negotiation. This paper estimates the savings that could exist if FSS prices were substituted for current drug prices among seniors, and it is not meant to be an exhaustive analysis of the economic complexities surrounding federal negotiation of pharmaceutical prices. The actual consequences of opening up the Federal Supply Schedule to a larger group are unknown. 23 There would likely be spillover effects with higher prices for cash-paying customers and private health plans as manufacturers work to regain profits, or perhaps less capacity for research and development by pharmaceutical manufacturers. There would be administrative costs associated with federal negotiation of prices that are not modeled here, although there may also likely be savings to the manufacturers in having to negotiate only once. A full discussion of these complexities is beyond the scope of this paper. The results of this study must be interpreted in the context of the study design and data sources. , MEPS is the most recent nationally representative source of prescription expenditures available that reflects actual drug utilization patterns nationally. This allows us to use the detailed data that are available in MEPS on individual insurance, copays, the frequency of refills, the number of pills per prescription (30 vs. 90 day), etc. It will be critical once 2006 data become available to determine whether negotiation of prices in part D has saved money for seniors and for society. We do note, however, that one study described above does demonstrate that Part D prices are very much higher than VA prices -on the same order of magnitude as found in this study. Additionally, our inflation of MEPS expenditures by the consumer price index may actually underestimate true prices in 2006, since drug prices are known to increase faster than inflation -this would lead to an underestimation of savings. 24 26 Basic Medicaid rebates are on average 15% of the Average Manufacturers Price (AMP); however, the AMP is also not publicly available. 8 Ultimately, our sensitivity analysis shows that these rebates are unlikely to be large enough to completely remove the savings calculated in this study. Finally, FSS prices are available to those agencies that dispense their own drugs and therefore do not take into account dispensing fees, while MEPS expenditures include the cost to the pharmacy of dispensing the medicine. Although this may overestimate the savings we calculate, it also would not likely be enough to change the results of the sensitivity analysis.
While the debate about negotiation of drug prices continues, prescription spending continues to increase faster than inflation and occupies a growing percentage of our national health expenditures. 9, 22, 27, 28 The use of lower-price generic drugs through tiered benefits, shifts towards mail-order pharmacy, and the removal from the market of highly priced drugs that turned out to be dangerous have contributed to some modest slowing in the rate of growth in drug spending until recently. 9 However, as rates of diabetes and other chronic diseases increase and a larger percentage of the population enters Medicare, these rates of growth may not be sustainable. The pricing of prescription drugs under Medicare Part D will be a central issue for cost containment in the future. An annual savings of over $20 billion could be realized if FSS prices could be achieved by the federal government for the majority of drugs used by seniors in [2003] [2004] , and there would be substantial savings if prices were only to reach FSS levels plus 50%. Whether or not price negotiation or price setting for prescription drugs in Medicare is a political or economic possibility, the magnitude of these savings should not be ignored.
